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European Central Bank working paper series 37Abstract
The paper analyzes how the removal of barriers to entry in banking a®ect
loan competition, bank stability and economic welfare. We consider a model of
spatial loan competition where a market that is served by less e±cient banks
is opened to entry by banks that are more e±cient in screening borrowers.
It is shown that there is typically too little entry and that market shares of
entrant banks are too small relative to their socially optimal level. This is
because e±cient banks internalize only the private but not the public bene¯ts
of their better credit assessments. Only when bank failure is very likely or
very costly, socially harmful entry can occur.
JEL classi¯cation: D43; D82; G21
Keywords: Entry deregulation; Bank competition
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Despite various policy initiatives promoting ¯nancial integration in the European
Union over the past decades, the scope of cross{border bank entry remains so far
rather limited. Does this observation re°ect the presence of any remaining barriers
to entry, or do banks decide optimally not to enter foreign markets, even in the
absence of entry barriers? Further, if banks decide against entry, is the outcome
socially optimal?
This paper develops a theoretical model demonstrating that there may indeed be
too little entry of banks into foreign markets for bank loans. Even in the absence of
regulatory barriers hampering banking integration, banks may decide not to enter
a foreign market, although entry would be in the interest of society. Furthermore,
when foreign banks enter, their market shares remain too small relative to domestic
banks. Consequently, additional initiatives enhancing private incentives for entry
can be socially bene¯cial.
The model considers two countries (A and B) which di®er only in the degree of
e±ciency of their banks' credit assessments. Each country has borrowers of di®erent
creditworthiness, and banks run informative credit tests on these borrowers before
they lend out funds. Banks in country A are more e±cient in conducting these tests
than banks in country B. In the presence of entry barriers, banks can only operate
in their home country. Hence, in country A the banks' loan portfolio is of better
quality and the risk of bank failure is lower than in country B. When barriers are
lifted, however, banks from country A may want to enter country B. Clearly, entry
of banks with better credit assessment always improves the overall quality of loans,
but it may also increase the risk of bank failure because competition becomes ¯ercer,
lowering each bank's bu®er against unfavorable return shocks.
The main ¯nding of this paper is that there tends to be too little entry relative to
the social optimum provided that there is no bank failure after entry. Furthermore,
whenever the more e±cient banks from country A enter the market for bank loans
of country B, their market shares remain too small.
The reason of these ine±ciencies is that entrants do not account for all welfare
gains that are associated with their better credit scoring. The most creditworthy
borrowers bene¯t from a better quality of credit tests because they are more likely
to be accepted. These borrowers, in the aggregate, make thus higher pro¯ts, but
only a fraction of these pro¯ts accrues to the lending bank. As a result, the more
e±cient banks from country A do not take into account all marginal welfare gains
that are associated with a loan rate cut attempting to win market shares in country
B. At the margin, their loan rates are too high and their market shares are too
5
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November 2004small. Similarly, banks from country A may dismiss an entry decision, contrary to
the welfare of society.
On the other hand, when bank failure after entry is possible, there may also be too
much entry of foreign banks. Incumbent banks in country B, expecting insolvency
after entry, tend to behave less competitively than without entry, thereby attracting
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The removal of entry barriers in banking is one of the main aspects of the integration
of ¯nancial markets that is taking place in many countries. In the European Union,
the First and Second Banking Directives (1977, 1988), and recently the Financial
Services Action Plan (1999) consisted of large sets of initiatives to ensure the full
integration of European banking markets; also various deregulations at the national
level have helped to foster banking integration. Although most of the cross{border
and cross{regional activities in Europe are taking place via mergers and acquisi-
tions, there has been substantial de{novo entry in Portugal, Southern Italy, and
in many of the Central and Eastern European accession countries (Barros (1995),
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001), Caviglia, Krause, and Thimann (2002)). In
the United States, the removal of bank branch restrictions in the 1980s has led to
signi¯cant entry by new banks and to improvements in the quality of loans (Ja-
yaratne and Strahan (1996)), but also a greater number of bank failures (Keeley
(1990)). However, the extent of de{novo entry in developed economies is regarded
as quite limited, whereas developing economies (most notably Latin America and
Eastern Europe) have attracted the most foreign bank entry (see Clarke, Cull, Mar-
tinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003)).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the e®ects of entry deregulation on loan
competition, bank stability and economic welfare. We consider a situation where
a market that is served by banks with weak credit assessment is opened to entry
by banks with better credit assessment facilities. Such entry, as expected, produces
a better allocation of funds to borrowers, but it also increases banks' exposures to
insolvency risk. The paper addresses the questions (i) whether there is too much or
too little entry relative to the social optimum, and (ii) how regulatory authorities
can respond so as to guarantee bank stability after entry deregulation and to remove
potential ine±ciencies.
We consider a model of two markets (countries, states) that are identical in all re-
spects except the degree of e±ciency of their banks' credit assessments. Each of
these markets is populated by two types of borrowers (\good" and \bad"), and
banks can be set up to conduct informative tests so as to single out good borrowers.
Because there is both idiosyncratic and aggregate credit risk, banks with weak credit
7
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lation may be imposed to avoid bank failure. Banks possess market power because
of a cost advantage in screening certain groups of borrowers due to geographical or
technological specialization.1
The central assumption of our model is that banks in one country have better
facilities to screen and to evaluate borrowers than banks in the other country; thus
their loan portfolio is of better quality and the risk of bank failure is lower. When
there are entry restrictions, banks are allowed to operate only in their country of
origin, so that the country with less e±cient banks is characterized by lower quality of
loans and by a higher risk of bank failure. When entry barriers are lifted, however,
e±cient banks may enter the market that was previously served only by the less
e±cient banks. Thus, in this model banks are attracted to another market because
they are more e±cient than the incumbents; this idea is best suited to describe
foreign bank entry in developing economies, whereas in developed economies other
motives may play a greater role.2 Obviously, entry of banks with better credit
assessment always improves the overall quality of loans, but it may also increase the
risk of bank failure because competition becomes ¯ercer, lowering each bank's bu®er
against bad return shocks.3
1Our modelling strategy uses a Salop location model, following related models of loan compe-
tition by Almazan (2002), Hauswald and Marquez (2002), Sussman and Zeira (1995) and Wong
and Chan (1993).
2In developed economies, foreign{bank entry is often attributed to the \follow the customer"
motive, rather than e±ciency di®erentials between entrants and incumbents. Quite the con-
trary, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) ¯nd that foreign{owned banks in the US are less pro¯table
than domestic{owned banks, although they attribute this to di®erences in input e±ciency whereas
output e±ciency is nearly equal. On the other hand, Claessens, DemirgÄ uc-Kunt, and Huizinga
(2001) ¯nd that foreign banks are more pro¯table than domestic banks in developing economies,
whereas the opposite is true in developed economies. Using data on 260 banks in OECD coun-
tries, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003) ¯nd that there is greater foreign presence when local banks are
relatively less e±cient. Comparing the performance of foreign and domestic banks in Columbia,
Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (2000) ¯nd that foreign banks have fewer non{performing loans and
higher productivity.
3For simplicity and for the purpose of this paper, our model completely abstracts from estab-
lished borrower{bank relationships that are crucial in many of the literature on entry in banking
(see e.g. Bouckaert and Degryse (2003), Dell'Ariccia (2001) and Dell'Ariccia, Friedman, and Mar-
quez (1999)). Unlike this literature, there are no switching costs or other hurdles to entry in
our model. This assumption is justi¯ed on the grounds that in catching{up economies where de{
8
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fail, entry is socially bene¯cial, but not vice versa. That is, entry of e±cient banks
may not take place even though it would be socially optimal. In other words, when
bank stability is guaranteed, entry is always in the interest of a social planner, but
there may be too little entry in equilibrium, and this is so even in the absence of
any exogenous borrower switching costs or other obstacles to entry. As a result,
policies promoting entry can be welfare{enhancing. Moreover, even when e±cient
banks enter, their market share remains too small relative to the socially optimal
level.
By showing that entry may be socially, but not privately optimal, the paper also
provides an explanation why various policy initiatives promoting the integration of
banking markets have resulted in little entry activity. Generally, markets are said to
be integrated when the law of one price holds. Complementary measures of ¯nancial
market integration are based on the amount of cross{border penetration and cross{
border activity of banks and other ¯nancial institutions. This paper argues that,
even in the absence of any regulatory frictions hampering banking integration, there
can be too little entry activity. Therefore, additional initiatives enhancing private
incentives for entry can be socially bene¯cial.
The explanation for these ine±ciencies is that entrant banks do not internalize all
marginal welfare gains that are associated with their better credit assessment. Even
when banks are able to price discriminate among borrowers of di®erent types, they
are unable to extract all marginal rents that are due to better lending quality. The
reason is that good borrowers bene¯t from better credit assessment because fewer of
them are rejected. These borrowers, in the aggregate, make thus higher pro¯ts, but
only a fraction of these pro¯ts accrues to the lender. As a result, e±cient lenders
do not take into account all welfare gains that are associated with a loan rate cut
attempting to win market shares. At the margin, their loan rates are too high and
their market shares too small. By a similar argument, e±cient lenders may dismiss
an entry decision even when it would be socially bene¯cial. These conclusions,
however, may not be true when bank failure becomes a problem, and this is even
novo entry is of most importance, relationship lending is of relatively minor importance. Also, if
banks plan to operate over longer horizons, established borrower{bank relationships become less
signi¯cant for entry decisions.
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The reason is that banks who expect to fail with some probability, may behave less
competitively (because they charge higher risk{premia), drawing e±cient banks into
the market even in such situations where it is socially not desirable.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the economic environment
and Section 3 discusses the equilibrium in the regulated economy. Sections 4 ana-
lyzes the potential equilibrium con¯gurations after entry deregulation, and Section
5 discusses the welfare e®ects of entry. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economic environment
Consider an economy consisting of two markets (countries), each comprising borrow-
ers, depositors, and banks. The markets are identical except for their characteristics
of banks. Each market is described by a Salop circle of unit circumference that is
populated by two types of uniformly distributed borrowers, each type of a unit mass.
There are two periods, \today" and \tomorrow". All borrowers have an investment
need of unit size today to yield tomorrow a payo® A if they are successful and zero if
they are unsuccessful. \Good" borrowers succeed idiosyncratically with probability





depends on tomorrow's aggregate state; in a \high{income" state of the world (that
occurs with probability ®), bad borrowers' success probability is ~ ¸
B
= ¸B=®, and
in a \low{income" state of the world, bad borrowers succeed with probability zero.
Thus, ¸B is the unconditional expected repayment probability of bad borrowers. We
assume that, in both states of the world, bad borrowers' success probability is below




Without this assumption, a lender who expects to be insolvent in the low{income
state would prefer lending to the risky bad borrowers. Thus (A0) excludes gambling
by lenders of limited liability.
There is a perfectly elastic supply of funds from depositors at rate ½. We assume
that it is e±cient to lend to good borrowers but ine±cient to lend to borrowers of
10
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¸




Because of assumption (A1) there is a role for banks that have access to a screening
technology to single out good borrowers. To screen borrowers, banks can be set up
at arbitrary positions on the circle at cost f. We assume that each bank can open at
most one such branch; an extension to the multi{branching case is straightforward
as long as no bank is allowed to open two branches next to each other. Screening
costs are increasing in distance of the borrower from the bank. Speci¯cally, we
assume that banks pay tx=2 to screen a borrower located at distance x from the
bank, so that the bank pays tx to screen all borrowers at distance x.4 With this
assumption, banks possess local market power because of a cost advantage over the
nearest competing bank.5 As we show below, because of local market power banks
charge higher interest rates on borrowers located closer to them, so that loan rates
are decreasing in borrower{bank distance.6
Borrower screening leads to a credit assessment that provides banks with a noisy
signal s 2 fG;Bg about the borrower's type. Let ' = Prob(s = GjG) = Prob(s =
BjB) > 1=2 be the probability that the signal is correct. Under (A0) and (A1) and
provided that the signal is informative enough (i.e. ' is big enough), banks lend only
to borrowers that are assessed positively. Because both borrower types are of unit
mass and because credit assessment signals are symmetric, each bank that screens
all borrowers at distance x wants to lend to a unit mass of them which is composed
of ' good borrowers and 1 ¡ ' bad borrowers. The credit repayment probability,
conditional on the aggregate state, is
~ ¸ ´ '¸
G + (1 ¡ ')~ ¸
B
:
4This location model has a geographical and a technological interpretation; if x is geographical
distance, banks pay travel costs to screen the borrower; in the technological interpretation, the
bank's ¯nancial analysts are specialized in a particular industry, and credit assessments are the
cheaper the more similar the producer is to the core specialization of the bank.
5Other theoretical contributions with similar implications are Sussman and Zeira (1995) and
Hauswald and Marquez (2002). Sussman and Zeira assume that banks' monitoring costs increase
in distance in a costly{state{veri¯cation model. Hauswald and Marquez assume that the quality
(not the cost) of credit assessment is falling (not increasing) in distance. See also Almazan (2002)
and Wong and Chan (1993) for related contributions.
6Empirical evidence of a negative relationship between loan rates and the borrower{lender
distance has been documented by Degryse and Ongena (2003).
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kets di®er only with respect to this parameter. In one market only \e±cient" banks
with quality parameter 'E operate, whereas in the other market only \ine±cient"
banks with quality parameter 'I < 'E operate.7 For convenience of the exposition,
we suppress the superscripts E and I for the rest of this and the following section.
Finally, in each market a banking regulator imposes a capital requirement on banks
in order to protect depositors from credit risks. This regulation requires banks to
¯nance a fraction k of their loans by equity capital. Equity capital is more costly
than bank deposits, and we assume that there is a perfectly elastic supply of equity
capital at rate ½0 > ½. ½0 can also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of equity
capital. To simplify the exposition and to concentrate on the interaction between
banks in the loans market, both ½ and ½0 are given to the bank in the market.8 The
cost of funds per unit of loan are
¹ ½ ´ ½(1 ¡ k) + ½
0k :
A bank failure occurs if the bank is unable to meet its deposit obligations from its
loan revenues; in that case the bank is closed down by the regulator, all bank capital
is liquidated, and depositors are paid only a fraction of their promised repayment.
Suppose now that a bank screens all borrowers located at distance x · d, and lends
to all borrowers that are assessed positively at loan rate rx. Then the expected
pro¯t of the bank, conditional on the aggregate state, is
~ ¼ = 2max
³ Z d
0






0 + tx dx :
7An advantage in credit assessment quality is only one possibility to model incentives for entry.
An alternative would be cost advantages in t or f, or the entry of new borrowers at a second
stage (as in Bouckaert and Degryse (2003)). We interpret credit assessment quality not as bank
expertise (which should arguably be higher for local banks, at least for a limited time period) but
as a measure of the bank's available tools to assess borrowers such as computation facilities and
the skills of its ¯nancial analysts.
8These assumptions are not innocuous when banks may fail in the low{income state, because
depositors and equity holders alike would ask the banks to pay a risk{premium (see e.g. Matutes
and Vives (2000) for a model where depositors form beliefs about the probability of bank failure).
However, when the probability of the low{income state is small (® is large), the assumption of
given ½ and ½0 seems appropriate. On the other hand, the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply
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out depositors and equity holders. On the other hand, if the expression in the max
operator is negative, deposit obligations cannot be met by loan revenues, the bank
is shut down, screening costs are lost, as are the opportunity costs of equity capital.
If the bank does not fail, the (unconditional) expected bank pro¯t is
¹ ¼ = E~ ¼ = 2
Z d
0
¹ ¸rx ¡ ¹ ½ ¡ tx dx ; (1)
where ¹ ¸ ´ '¸G + (1 ¡ ')¸B is the expected repayment probability, and ¹ ½ are the
costs of funds de¯ned above. If the bank fails in the low{income state, the expected
bank pro¯t is
¹ ¼ = E~ ¼ = 2
Z d
0
¹ ¸®rx ¡ ¹ ½® ¡ tx dx ; (2)
where ¹ ¸® ´ ®'¸G + (1 ¡ ')¸B is the e®ective repayment probability, and ¹ ½® ´
®½(1 ¡ k) + ½0k are the e®ective costs of funds. Note that ¹ ½® < ¹ ½ and ¹ ¸® < ¹ ¸,
re°ecting the fact that a failing bank is shut down, so that both its expected loan
revenues and its expected costs of funds are lower.
An equilibrium in the regulated economy is described by the following four{stage
game. At stage I, banks decide to enter their home market at arbitrary locations,
paying the sunk set{up cost f. At stage II, banks engage in price competition,
potentially discriminating among borrowers at di®erent locations. At stage III,
borrowers apply at (potentially many) banks. At stage IV, banks decide whether
they screen certain borrowers or not. After screening, they make o®ers to those
borrowers that are assessed positively and borrowers accept the best o®er. If there
is a tie, borrowers split equally between the two o®ers. We assume that borrowers, as
banks without screening, do not know their type. Banks know if certain borrowers
are screened by other banks, but they do not know the outcome of their screening.
We restrict the analysis to equilibria in which banks are always located symmetrically
around the circle. This limitation can be justi¯ed on the grounds that the symmetric
con¯guration is an equilibrium when banks decide freely about location (see, for
instance, MacLeod et al. (1988)).
An equilibrium in the deregulated economy starts from an equilibrium location of the
regulated economy but allows banks from each market to enter the other market.
We assume that any relocation of incumbents incurs a payment of the setup cost f
13
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want to enter the market of ine±cient banks, but not vice versa. Because the market
with e±cient banks is already blockaded to entry by e±cient banks, ine±cient banks
cannot pro¯tably enter their market either.10 Therefore, at stage I, e±cient banks
decide about entry, given the locations of ine±cient banks. The subsequent stages
II, III and IV are as in the regulated economy. Throughout the analysis we restrict
attention to such situations where at most one bank enters between two incumbents.
This limitation is justi¯ed provided that the e±ciency di®erential between incum-
bents and entrants is not too big. Whenever one e±cient bank enters between two
ine±cient incumbents, it must locate symmetrically between the incumbents. This
result is shown in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
Before we compute equilibria in the regulated and in the deregulated economy, we
solve the last three stages of the game. We consider competition between two banks,
named 1 and 2, located distance ` apart, that have potentially di®erent (e®ective)
repayment probabilities and di®erent (e®ective) costs of funds, labelled ¸i and ½i,
i = 1;2 (see (1) and (2)). This comprises in particular those scenarios where one
bank is more e±cient in screening than the other or where one or both banks fail in
the low{income state. We consider competition between these banks for borrowers
located between them, i.e. at distance x 2 [0;`] from bank 1 (distance ` ¡ x from
bank 2). Because of our above{mentioned restriction to symmetric locations, no
other bank competes with banks 1 and 2 for these borrowers. The following Lemma
shows that there is a pure{strategy equilibrium where bank 1 wins the market for
all borrowers in its neighborhood by o®ering the Bertrand loan rate at which bank 2
would make zero pro¯ts. Moreover, each borrower is screened by exactly one bank.11
9Instead of relocating, banks would open another branch at the same cost, yielding them higher
pro¯t. Because they do not open additional branches in their home market in the regulated
economy, they also do not do so under deregulation. Hence relocation cannot be pro¯table either.
10One may wonder whether ine±cient banks enter the other market and stop screening in an
attempt to save screening costs in exchange for a poor selection of borrowers (as some US banks
specialized in credit cards to high{risk consumers). However, such behavior is excluded by as-
sumption (A1) in our model: lending without screening cannot be pro¯table.
11It is well{known that interest rate games with asymmetric information may have no pure{
strategy equilibria (e.g. Broecker (1990), Dell'Ariccia, Friedman, and Marquez (1999), Hauswald
and Marquez (2002)). The reason for our di®erent outcome is that (i) marginal screening costs
are positive (unlike the models of Broecker and Hauswald/Marquez); (ii) there are no established
bank{borrower relationships (unlike Dell'Ariccia et al.); (iii) banks make interest rate o®ers before
14
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i = 1;2, and that ` is not too large. Then, for all borrowers located at distance
x · ¹ x = ¸1½2 ¡ ¸2½1 + t¸1`
t(¸1 + ¸2)
from bank 1, banks 1 and 2 set interest rates
r1x = r2x = ½2 + t(` ¡ x)
¸2
(· A)
at stage II, borrowers apply at both banks at stage III, and only bank 1 screens
these borrowers, making an o®er only to those that are assessed positively. Bank
1's pro¯t from screening all borrowers x · ¹ x is ¼1 = ¸1 + ¸2
2¸2
¹ x.
If x > ¹ x, the reverse result holds with banks 1 and 2 interchanged and with ` ¡ x
replaced by x. Moreover, if ¹ x · 0 or if ¹ x ¸ `, one of the two banks wins the whole
market x 2 [0;`].
Proof: Appendix.
3 The regulated economy
Consider the benchmark scenario of the regulated economy where banks of the same
screening quality play the stage I location game. Since banks choose locations simul-
taneously, an equilibrium is a contestable market equilibrium in which the number of
banks is generally indeterminate and is restricted by two features: (i) bank pro¯ts
are non{negative; (ii) it is not pro¯table for another bank to enter the market. We
con¯ne the analysis to such cases where the loan market is covered and where banks
do not have monopoly power over certain groups of borrowers (i.e. each borrower
applies at two banks at least). As mentioned before, we also concentrate on sym-
metric equilibrium locations only. We consider ¯rst an equilibrium in which banks
do not fail in the low{income state, and we turn then to equilibria where banks fail
in the low{income state.
In an equilibrium without bank failure, suppose that n banks locate symmetrically
around the circle so that the distance between any two banks is ` = 1=n. From
they screen (unlike Hauswald/Marquez). Assumption (iii) may be relaxed by allowing banks to
undercut their initial o®ers after stage IV without changing the equilibrium stated in Lemma 1.
15
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(i.e. ¹ x = 1=(2n)), and each bank charges interest rates rx = (¹ ½ + t(1=n ¡ x))=¹ ¸ on
borrowers located at distance x · 1=(2n). To guarantee that all these borrowers
are willing to apply at this bank and at the neighboring bank, we must have that
rx · A for all x or
t
n · ¹ ¸A ¡ ¹ ½ : (3)
If that condition is satis¯ed, Lemma 1 applies and there is Bertrand competition
between every two neighboring banks for all borrowers located between them. The
nearest bank's expected pro¯t from attracting and screening the borrower located
at distance x is
¼x = ¹ ¸rx ¡ ¹ ½ ¡ tx = t(` ¡ 2x) ;
and so the bank's expected pro¯t is






Therefore, banks enter the market i® ` = 1=n ¸
q
(2f)=t. On the other hand, it
must not be pro¯table for any other bank to enter the market at stage I and to
locate in the middle between two banks, i.e. at distance `0 = `=2 from any of the two
banks. By the above argument, such entry would pay o® the pro¯t t(`0)2=2 = t`2=8.
Hence, entry is unpro¯table i® ` = 1=n <
q
(8f)=t. Therefore the number n of
banks satis¯es r
t




To guarantee that all n satisfying the contestable{market conditions (4) are also
compatible with the covered{markets condition (3), we impose the following as-
sumption: q
8ft < ¹ ¸A ¡ ¹ ½ : (A2)
To make sure that banks do not fail, loan revenues must exceed deposit liabilities




Grx ¡ (1 ¡ k)½ dx ¸ 0 ;






n) ¸ (1 ¡ ')¸
B(1 ¡ k)½ : (5)
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solvency of banks in the regulated economy. The condition has a very intuitive in-
terpretation. First, solvency is always guaranteed when the banks' credit assessment
is good enough (high '); in the limit ' = 1 banks do not lend to bad borrowers
and they are therefore not hit by the low{income state. Second, a high enough cap-
ital requirement ratio also guarantees solvency. Third, strong market power (high t
or low n) is also bene¯cial for solvency because loan rate margins serve as a bu®er
against bad return shocks. Conversely, in the limit of a perfectly competitive market
(t = 0), (5) implies that some capital requirement is needed to avoid failure when
credit assessment is not perfectly informative (' < 1).
Proposition 1: Under assumptions (A0), (A1) and (A2), there is an equilibrium
where banks do not fail, provided that (5) holds. The equilibrium number n of
banks satis¯es (4), and bank pro¯ts are t
2n
2.
We turn now to an analysis of equilibria with bank failure. The only di®erence to
the previous analysis is that now the banks' e®ective repayment probability and the
e®ective costs of funds are replaced by ¹ ¸® and ¹ ½®. Therefore, markets are covered
with n banks i®
t
n · ¹ ¸®A ¡ ¹ ½® ; (3')
and assumption (A2) becomes
q
8ft < ¹ ¸®A ¡ ¹ ½® : (A2')




Grx ¡ (1 ¡ k)½ dx < 0 ;
where rx = (¹ ½® +t(`¡x))=¹ ¸® is now the Bertrand loan rate imposed on a borrower
located distance x apart, provided that banks expect to fail in the low{income state.
A straightforward calculation shows that this condition is satis¯ed if, and only if,
condition (5) is violated. Hence, low capital requirement, poor credit assessment, or
¯erce competition can induce failure of banks. Paralleling Proposition 1 we have
Proposition 2: Under assumptions (A0), (A1) and (A2'), there is an equilibrium
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equilibrium number n of banks satis¯es (4), and bank pro¯ts are t
2n
2.
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize all equilibria in the regulated economy where
banks do not have local monopoly power. The equilibrium number of banks in both
cases is only restricted by the contestable markets condition (4). Banks do not fail
whenever (5) holds, but failure occurs with positive probability otherwise.12 Also,
expected bank pro¯ts are the same in both cases, and they do neither depend on
the quality of credit assessment, nor on the quality of borrowers, nor on capital
requirements, but only the parameters determining market power (t and f). The
reason is that in this symmetric market with equally e®ective credit assessment,
all banks charge the same risk premium over the costs of funds, but margins (and
bank pro¯ts) depend only on local screening advantages and on the distance to the
nearest competitor.
It is also instructive to compute the social surplus that is generated by banks. Each
bank generates an ex{ante surplus that is independent of whether the bank fails or
not: because all agents are risk{neutral, a bank failure is simply an ex{ante transfer
of surplus from depositors to bank owners, leaving total surplus una®ected. Unless
there are spill{over e®ects or other costs of failure, the possibility of bank failure
takes no impact on economic welfare in this model. The ex{ante surplus that each




¹ ¸A ¡ ¹ ½ ¡ tx dx ¡ f :
Therefore, total surplus is
S(n) = ns(n) = ¹ ¸A ¡ ¹ ½ ¡ t
4n ¡ fn : (6)
The socially optimal number of banks in the regulated economy is therefore n¤ = q
t=(4f), a number that lies within the range (4) of free{entry equilibria (for a
related result in a non{banking framework, see MacLeod et al. (1988, p. 442)).
12Because the number of banks is generally indeterminate in the contestable markets equilibrium,
there can be situations where banks fail in one equilibrium with many banks and low margins,
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p
tf which is positive provided
that (A2) holds. Therefore, the social optimum is also an equilibrium with free
entry. Conversely, any free{entry equilibrium also leads to positive surplus: it is
easy to show that S(n) > 0 for all n satisfying the contestable{markets condition
(4), provided that (A2) holds. Hence we ¯nd
Proposition 3: Suppose that (A0), (A1), (A2) are satis¯ed. Then the social
optimum is an equilibrium with free entry of banks. Conversely, any free{entry
equilibrium is socially bene¯cial.
We will show in the next Section that this connection between socially and privately
bene¯cial entry of banks breaks down after removal of entry barriers. When bank
failure is not a problem, entry of e±cient banks is always socially bene¯cial whenever
it is privately bene¯cial, but not vice versa. That is, there are situations where entry
does not take place even though it would be socially bene¯cial. Conversely, when
ine±cient banks fail after entry, there can also be situations where entry occurs even
when it is socially not desirable, and this is true in spite of the absence of social
costs of bank failures.
4 Financial market integration
Starting from an equilibrium in the regulated economy, suppose now that barriers
to entry are lifted, so that all banks are allowed to operate in the markets of their
choice. Locations of incumbent banks are given from the regulated economy, assum-
ing implicitly that banks do not anticipate future entry deregulation. In particular,
banks do not \deter entry" by opening more branches. Accounting for such entry
deterrence would clearly make entry even less likely and would only reinforce our
main conclusion.
For simplicity it is assumed that banks cannot adapt their screening technology in
response to entry deregulation. When ine±cient banks are permitted to improve
their screening technology, they may decide to do so in order to deter entry. More-
over, when depositors and equity holders demand higher risk premia at riskier banks,
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case, it is plausible that incumbents improve their screening technology in response
to deregulation if such adjustments are not too costly.
Let 'I = ' be the quality parameter of \ine±cient" banks in one market, and
'E > ' be the screening quality of \e±cient" banks in the other market. Clearly,
ine±cient banks do not want to enter the market of e±cient banks simply because
entry is not even pro¯table for e±cient banks, so it cannot be pro¯table for the
less e±cient ones either. On the other hand, e±cient banks may want to enter the
market of ine±cient banks.
Our model completely abstracts from established borrower{bank relationships or
from local expertise of incumbent banks that may serve as barriers to entry (see
e.g. Bouckaert and Degryse (2003), Dell'Ariccia (2001) and Dell'Ariccia, Friedman,
and Marquez (1999)); such e®ects could be easily incorporated in the form of switch-
ing costs for borrowers or di®erential costs of entry. To keep the model as simple as
possible, we completely abstract from such e®ects and focus solely on di®erences in
credit assessment quality between incumbents and entrants. This focus seems suited
for a model of an emerging economy where established borrower{bank relationships
are of relatively minor importance.
If e±cient banks enter, they set up branches (at cost f again). To keep the analysis
simple, we assume that the entrant branch operates under a single solvency con-
straint with the holding bank; that is, even if the entrant branch fails, the holding
bank is committed to bail it out. Under the assumption that e±cient banks never
fail in their home market and that the home market is big enough, the joint company
never fails either, and we can treat the entrant branch like a single bank operating
under full liability; when local loan revenues fall short of local deposit obligations,
the home bank intervenes to settle any imbalances.13
We start from an equilibrium location of ine±cient banks in the regulated economy,
13It is a striking feature of cross{border entry in the European Union that it often takes place
via subsidiaries instead of branches (see Dermine (2003)). Unlike foreign branches, subsidiaries are
subject to foreign solvency regulations. However, even with subsidiaries it is plausible to assume
that the holding company interferes if the subsidiary is in ¯nancial distress. Failure of foreign
subsidiaries may be particularly important in those scenarios where ine±cient banks enter e±cient
markets, but such situations do not occur in this model.
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con¯guration of Proposition 1). Then, after entry deregulation and entry of e±cient
banks, there can be one of the following three outcomes:
(A) Both banks operate and ine±cient banks remain solvent.
(B) Both banks operate and ine±cient banks fail in the low{income state.
(C) The e±cient bank crowds out the ine±cient bank.
Each of these cases may occur in equilibrium, depending on the economic fundamen-
tals, particularly on the e±ciency di®erential 'E¡' and on the capital requirement.
We will start to examine the conditions leading to the type (B) equilibrium, dis-
cussing the type (A) and (C) equilibria afterward.
Note that if an e±cient bank enters, it locates exactly between two ine±cient banks
(see Lemma 2 of the Appendix), so the distance to any competitor is `=2 = 1=(2n)
where n is the number of ine±cient banks (and the number of entering e±cient
banks). Consider a borrower that is located at distance x from the e±cient bank,
so his distance to the ine±cient bank is `=2 ¡ x. The ine±cient bank, expecting
failure in the low{income state, operates with e®ective repayment probability ¹ ¸
I
® =
®'I¸G + (1 ¡ 'I)¸B and costs of funds ¹ ½® (see (2)).14 Lemma 1 implies that the
e±cient bank bids down the ine±cient bank to its break{even rate
r
I
x = (¹ ½® + t(`=2 ¡ x))=¹ ¸
I
® (7)








¹ ½® + t(`
2 ¡ x)
´
¡ ¹ ½ ¡ tx :
Thus, in the type (B) equilibrium, the e±cient bank screens all borrowers located
at distance
x · ¹ x
B ´ 1
t(¹ ¸







E + ¹ ¸














E + (¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I
®)k½
0 ¡ (¹ ¸
I




14We de¯ne analogously the e®ective repayment probabilities for the non{failing ine±cient and
e±cient banks as ¹ ¸
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the market equally, i.e. ¹ xB = `=4. However, if the e±ciency di®erential becomes


















Therefore, there is entry of e±cient banks, and e±cient banks do not crowd out
ine±cient banks if
`









To make sure that the entry equilibrium is in fact of type (B), we have to guarantee







x ¡ (1 ¡ k)½ dx < 0 ;
where rE
x = (¹ ½ + t(`=2 ¡ x))=¹ ¸
E is the break{even rate of e±cient banks that is
charged by ine±cient banks in their market. This failure condition is equivalent to
'¸
G(k½
0 + t` + 2¹ x
B
4 ) < (1 ¡ k)½¸
G('
E ¡ ') + (1 ¡ k)½(1 ¡ '
E)¸
B : (10)
Note that for 'E = ' this condition coincides with the negation of (5) when
(` + 2¹ xB)=4 is replaced by 3`=4. It can be seen that both conditions for an equi-
librium (B), the entry condition (9) and the failure condition (10) are favoured by
more e±cient entrants: better credit assessment makes entry more pro¯table, but it
also makes failure of the incumbent banks more likely because the entrant charges
lower risk premia, depressing margins for the incumbent banks, making them more
vulnerable to bad return shocks.15 We can summarize these ¯ndings as follows.
Proposition 4: Suppose that (9) and (10) are satis¯ed. Then the deregulated
economy has an equilibrium where banks with e±ciency 'E enter the market of
banks with e±ciency ' < 'E, and where ine±cient banks fail in the low{income
state.
15There is also an opposite e®ect since the market share of incumbents (`¡2¹ xB) is decreasing in
'E which makes incumbents less vulnerable to bad shocks because they pay lower screening costs
on average. Numeric experiments suggest however that the other e®ect dominates.
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failure. The analysis of this case parallels the above. The only di®erence is that
now ine±cient banks operate with the e®ective repayment probability ¹ ¸
I and the
costs of funds ¹ ½ (replacing ¹ ¸
I
® and ¹ ½® above). Hence, entry without crowding{out
occurs i®
`


















E + (¹ ¸













¸ (1 ¡ k)½¸
G('
E ¡ ') + (1 ¡ k)½(1 ¡ '
E)¸
B: (12)
Obviously, (12) is satis¯ed if the capital requirement ratio k is big enough. Also the
entry condition (11) is favoured by a higher capital requirement ratio, as was the
case before. Note, however, that (12) is not the negation of the failure condition
(10). The reason is that the market sizes of e±cient banks, ¹ xB and ¹ xA, are di®erent,
depending on whether ine±cient banks fail or not. Numeric experiments suggest
that ¹ xB < ¹ xA; because ine±cient banks that are subject to insolvency risk operate
under lower e®ective costs of funds than non{failing banks, they also gain a bigger
market share when they compete with e±cient banks. This observation implies
that both (10) and (12) can be satis¯ed simultaneously, implying the existence of
multiple equilibria, some with bank failure and some without. However, numerical
experiments also revealed that those regions in parameter space leading to multiple
equilibria are very small (see the example below).
Proposition 5: Suppose that (11) and (12) are satis¯ed. Then the deregulated
economy has an equilibrium where banks with e±ciency 'E enter the market of
banks with e±ciency ' < 'E, and where banks do not fail.
Finally, an equilibrium of type (C) occurs if e±cient banks completely crowd out
ine±cient banks, i.e. if either ¹ xA ¸ `=2 or ¹ xB ¸ `=2, depending on whether (10)
or (12) holds. In such a case, ine±cient banks may still stay in the market and
compete with e±cient banks (in the hope to win market shares later on after poten-
tial e±ciency improvements), or they are shut down and leave the market. In the
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only di®erence that credit assessment is overall of better quality than under entry
regulation.
Proposition 6: Suppose that either (10) and ¹ xB > `=2, or (12) and ¹ xA > `=2.
Then banks with e±ciency 'E enter the market of banks with e±ciency ' < 'E,
and e±cient banks win the whole market.
Because it is di±cult to analyze the equilibrium conditions (9)-(12) in full generality,
it is instructive to use a numerical example to illustrate graphically the role of the
underlying parameters. Each of these equilibrium conditions de¯nes an implicit
relation between the e±ciency of entrants, 'E, and the capital requirement, k. We
solved numerically for these curves, and plotted them in Figure 1 wherever they
de¯ne a boundary between two of the four possible equilibrium regimes (no entry
or entry of type A, B, or C).16 The underlying parameter set was chosen such that,
before deregulation, there is no failure in the market served by two ine±cient banks
with e±ciency ' = 0:7 when the capital requirement ratio is at least 2.5%. That is,
the requirements of Proposition 1 are satis¯ed for n = 2 and k = 0:025.17
It can be seen from the ¯gure that entry occurs only for a su±ciently high e±ciency
di®erential 'E ¡ '. For a low capital requirement ratio, ine±cient banks fail after
entry, whereas a high enough capital requirement ratio prevents entry (about 8%
in our example). It turns out that a higher e±ciency di®erential is required for
entry when the capital requirement ratio is low and ine±cient banks fail. When
the e±ciency di®erential becomes big enough, ine±cient banks are crowded out of
the market. Note also that the capital requirement ratio that is needed to prevent
failure is increasing in the e±ciency of the entrant banks (i.e. the boundary between
type A and type B equilibrium regimes is increasing). As more e±cient banks enter,
incumbents must charge lower margins and are thus exposed to greater insolvency
risk; therefore a higher capital requirement is needed to avoid failure. Note, however,
that bank failures have no social costs in this model; the model is therefore ill{suited
16As mentioned above, the failure conditions (10) and (12) are not identical, so that there is
also a region of co{existing equilibria of types (A) and (B). Because this region is negligibly small,
Figure 1 shows only one of the two (nearly coinciding) equilibrium curves.
17The other parameters are ¸G = 1, ¸B = 0:3, ® = 0:5, ½ = 1:3, ½0 = 2, t = 0:3, f = 0:02, A = 2.
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to discuss policy from a normative viewpoint. As we discuss in Section 6 below, there
may even be positive welfare e®ects of bank failure in the longer run.
To conclude this section, entry of banks with better credit assessment facilities may
lead to a higher risk of bank failure. This is despite the fact that the average quality
of loans improves after entry; as borrowers are screened by more e±cient banks,
more bad borrowers are rejected and more good borrowers are accepted. The next
section explores the welfare consequences of entry deregulation.
5 The welfare e®ects of integration
We have seen that, in the regulated economy, free entry does not con°ict with the
objective of a central planner interested in maximizing social surplus (Proposition
3). This ¯nding does not extend to an economy that is already served by ine±cient
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why free entry does not lead to the ¯rst{best solution that would be chosen by
a social planner who can decide about entry of banks and who is able to control
their pricing policies. The ¯rst reason is a \pricing ine±ciency", the second is an
\entry ine±ciency". Both ine±ciencies have to do with the fact that e±cient banks
do not internalize all welfare gains from their better credit assessment. The pricing
ine±ciency says that e±cient banks win only a too small market share relative to the
social optimum; ¯rst{best e±ciency could be achieved by loan rate controls allowing
e±cient banks to win a larger market. Because such rate controls are di±cult to
implement in practice and problematic on its own, we then focus on the second{best
solution where the central planner decides about entry, leaving pricing decisions to
banks. We ask then whether the second{best solution coincides with the free{entry
equilibrium. Because of an \entry ine±ciency" the answer is negative; provided that
the risk of bank failure is low enough, entry is always socially bene¯cial, but not vice
versa. That is, there are situations where entry does not occur even though it would
be socially bene¯cial. The reason is again that e±cient banks do not internalize all
surplus they are generating. Policies promoting entry would be socially bene¯cial.
On the other hand, with bank failure it can also be the case that socially suboptimal
entry occurs, and this is even possible when there are no social costs of bank failure.
The reason for this curious outcome is that incumbent banks, expecting failure after
entry, behave less competitively than before entry deregulation. This draws e±cient
banks into the market even when it would be better not to have them entering.
If there is no entry, the surplus that the n ine±cient banks generate is (see (6))
S
NE = ¹ ¸
IA ¡ ¹ ½ ¡ t
4n ¡ nf : (13)
If there is entry of n e±cient banks, each locating symmetrically and serving the
market ¹ x 2 [0;1=(2n)], the surplus is
S
E = 2n
³ Z ¹ x
0
¹ ¸








NE + 2n¹ x(¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I)A + 2nt¹ x
³ 1
2n ¡ ¹ x
´
¡ nf : (14)
Note again that the possibility of bank failure does not a®ect social surplus. From
(13) and (14), the welfare gain (or loss) from entry is
2n¹ xA(¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I) + 2nt¹ x
³ 1
2n ¡ ¹ x
´
¡ nf : (15)
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¹ x
S = 1
4n + (¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I)A
2t ;
provided that ¹ xS < 1=(2n) (otherwise ¹ xS = 1=(2n)). The market size of e±cient
banks increases in the e±ciency di®erential, and when this di®erential is zero, it
is optimal to split the market equally. We ¯nd, however, that the socially optimal
market size is bigger than the market size that obtains with free pricing and without
bank failures.18
Proposition 7: The market share of e±cient banks in the free{entry equilibrium
without bank failure is smaller than their socially optimal market share.
Proof: Appendix.
The conclusion of Proposition 7 appears to be at odds with the conventional wis-
dom that perfect price discrimination results in e±ciency (see e.g. Spence (1976)).
The intuitive explanation for our divergent result is that, in spite of discriminatory
pricing, there is additional surplus accruing to borrowers that is not re°ected in the
e±cient banks' pro¯ts. Therefore e±cient banks operate in a market that is too
small relative to the social optimum.19
To remove the ine±ciency of Proposition 7, a regulator could impose some form of
loan rate control (e.g. forcing ine±cient banks to charge higher rates so as to help
e±cient banks gain market share), but such rate controls are not very appealing
and particularly di±cult to implement in practice. An alternative measure helping
to increase the market share of banks with better credit assessment is the imposi-
tion of risk{adjusted capital requirements, as promoted in the \Basel II" regulatory
18The result clearly extends also to the case with bank failure when the probability of the low{
income state is small enough.
19In a non{bank framework where Salop ¯rms i with pro¯t functions ¼i = pix ¡ci ¡tx compete
under discriminatory pricing pix, the allocation of consumers to ¯rms is socially optimal (see
Bhaskar and To (2003)), and this is even true when there are asymmetries in costs ci. However,
the analogy to our set{up are ¯rms with pro¯t functions ¸ipix ¡ c ¡ tx where all ¯rms pay the
same cost per customer c, but once these costs are paid, they produce di®erent amounts of an




Working Paper Series No. 403
November 2004framework. Provided that the banks' portfolios of borrowers can be observed by su-
pervisory authorities, ine±cient banks would have to raise more equity capital per
unit of loans than e±cient banks. Because equity capital is costly, ine±cient banks
lose market share in favor of more e±cient banks. However, even this measure could
not implement the ¯rst{best allocation, because higher capital requirements come
at welfare losses since total surplus falls when total costs of funds go up.
For these reasons, we now turn to the second{best analysis, assuming that market
shares are those obtained in the stage II pricing game. We ask under what condition
entry is socially bene¯cial. Again we assume that we are in a regime without bank
failure (or that the probability of bank failure is small enough), discussing the other
case below. From (15), the type (A) equilibrium is socially bene¯cial i®
2¹ x
AA(¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I) + 2t¹ x
A
³ 1
2n ¡ ¹ x
A
´
¸ f ; (16)
whereas the type (C) equilibrium is socially bene¯cial i®
1
n(¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I)A ¸ f : (17)
On the other hand, from (11) we know that a free{entry equilibrium of type (A) or











2 ¸ f : (18)
The following proposition shows that free entry is always socially bene¯cial (i.e. (18)
implies (16) or (17)), but not vice versa. The intuition for that result is similar to
the above: e±cient banks' pro¯ts do not re°ect all welfare gains from better credit
assessment. Thus, policies promoting entry can be welfare{enhancing.
Proposition 8: A free{entry equilibrium without failure of ine±cient banks (type
(A) or type (C)) is socially bene¯cial. Conversely, there are situations where entry
is socially bene¯cial, but where e±cient banks stay out of the market.
Proof: Appendix.
Proposition 8 does not generalize to the cases of bank failures. First of all, and
as mentioned in Section 3, our model completely abstracts from any social costs of
bank failures. When there are such costs, the above conclusions can only remain
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too large. But even in the absence of social costs to bank failures, the conclusion of
Proposition 8 does not extend to type (B) equilibria with failure of ine±cient banks.
The reason is that ine±cient banks which are not exposed to failure risk before
deregulation, may fail after entry of e±cient banks. This exposure to failure risk
can make ine±cient banks less competitive because they charge higher margins on
their lending costs, which draws e±cient banks into the market, even when it is not
socially bene¯cial.20 This can be seen from the break{even rate of the ine±cient bank
in (7). If this bank expects to fail, it faces both lower ex{ante funding costs ¹ ½® < ½
(because it only pays out depositors under solvency) and a lower loan repayment
probability ¹ ¸® < ¸. These two e®ects on the break{even interest rate go in opposite
directions, but because monitoring costs are sunk, the positive e®ect can dominate;
hence a bank exposed to failure risk may charge higher interest rates than a solvent
bank.
To give a numerical example, we use the parameter values of Figure 1 again to
compare the curves leading to entry in the free{entry equilibrium (from Figure 1)
with the second{best entry condition (16) above (replacing ¹ xA by ¹ xB when neces-
sary). Figure 2 shows that, without bank failure, the socially optimal entry curve is
always to the left of the free{entry equilibrium curve (implying that entry is always
bene¯cial). With bank failure, however, the two curves intersect, so that there is
a (small) region in parameter space, where entry occurs even though it is socially
ine±cient.21 Note that this last conclusion holds even in the absence of any social
costs of bank failure.
6 Conclusions
The focus of this paper is a speci¯c aspect of ¯nancial market integration: the
removal of barriers to entry of foreign banks with better credit assessment. There
are two main conclusions. First, provided that solvency of banks after entry is
20One may suspect that banks with limited liability behave more competitively because they
have incentives to gamble. In this model, however, gambling is excluded by assumption (A0).
21Note that the Figures are based on a relatively large failure risk (® = 0:5). When failure risk
becomes smaller (® ¸ 0:8), the region of socially ine±cient entry disappears.
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guaranteed, there is too little entry relative to the socially optimal level and market
shares of entrant banks are too small. The reason is that entrants do not account for
all welfare gains that are associated with their better credit scoring. Thus they do
not price aggressively enough and they may stay out of the market even when entry
would be better for society. Second, when solvency of banks cannot be guaranteed,
there may be too much entry of foreign banks. Incumbent banks which expect failure
after entry behave less competitively than without entry, thus inducing foreign banks
to enter although it would be better if they stayed out of the market.
There are several directions in which this model could be extended in order to ac-
count for other important aspects of banking integration. Important, yet missing
features are the role of established borrower{bank relationships (as an implicit obsta-
cle to entry) and potential social costs of bank failures (from which this one{period
model with risk{neutral agents abstracts away). Regarding established relation-
ships, it is not clear in what direction borrower switching costs would drive the
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entry. Regarding costs of bank failure, an interesting model extension would be a
multi{period scenario that takes into account the long{run consequences of banking
integration. If entry occurs in the beginning, with banks playing the pricing game
repeatedly in all future periods, failure of ine±cient banks would have social costs
and social bene¯ts in all future periods. On the cost side, average screening costs
go up because there are fewer banks in the market after failure of some incumbent
banks. On the bene¯t side, average screening quality improves and more bad bor-
rowers get rejected. Which of the two e®ects dominates and determines the welfare
e®ect is a topic for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We proceed by backward induction, starting at stage IV.
We show ¯rst that bank 2 does not screen borrowers x · ¹ x when bank 1 screens
them. The argument is similar to a ¯nding by Broecker (1990): multiple screening
lowers the average quality of borrowers, and because bank 2 breaks even when it
screens alone, it must incur losses when both banks screen. To show this formally
in this model, let '1 and '2 be the credit assessment qualities of the two banks,
so that the credit repayment probability of bank 2, if it screens alone, is ¸2 =
'2¸G +(1¡'2)¸B (assuming that bank 2 does not fail in the low{income state; the
other case is analogous). If bank 2 screens borrower x who is also screened by bank
1, bank 2 attracts all borrowers that are assessed positively by 2 and negatively
by 1 plus half of all borrowers that are assessed positively by both banks (because
there is a tie at stage II). Hence, bank 2 attracts '2(1 ¡ '1=2) good borrowers and
(1 ¡ '2)(1 + '1=2) bad borrowers located at x, a total less than one. Therefore,
^ ¸2 = '2(1¡'1=2)¸G+(1¡'2)(1+'1=2)¸B borrowers repay their loan and the costs of
funds are ^ ½2 = ('2(1¡'1=2)+(1¡'2)(1+'1=2))½2. Hence, at r2 = (½2+t(`¡x))=¸2,
bank 2's expected payo® from screening borrowers at x is
^ ¸2
¸2





½2 < 1 ;
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at x. On the other hand, bank 1 clearly prefers to screen the borrower at x if bank 2
does not screen because this guarantees non{negative pro¯ts, whereas non{screening
and lending must incur losses because of (A1). This completes stage IV.
Because of the assumptions of the Lemma, ri · A for i = 1;2. Therefore, all
borrowers would make non{negative expected pro¯t from a loan at any of the two
banks, and so they apply at both banks at stage III.
Finally, at stage II, it does not pay for bank 2 to undercut. Although it could
thereby attract all borrowers that it assesses positively (avoiding the above adverse
selection problem), it would still incur losses because r2 is the interest rate where
bank 2 makes zero pro¯ts by screening alone. It also does not pay for bank 2 to raise
the interest rate at stage II and to screen at stage IV since it would again end up
with an adverse selection of borrowers implying losses. On the other hand, bank 1
will not lower the interest rate because this would only lower loan revenues without
altering the quality of its borrowers. Bank 1 will also not raise the interest rate,
because then bank 2 will start screening at stage IV (making zero pro¯ts though)
so that bank 1 ends up with an adverse selection of borrowers and a loss because of
(A1).









This completes the proof. 2
Lemma 2: Suppose that two ine±cient banks (0 and 1) are located distance ` apart
and that an e±cient bank decides about entry at distance y from bank 0 (distance
`¡y from bank 1). Then it is optimal for the e±cient bank to locate in the middle,
i.e. y = `=2.
Proof: Suppose that the two existing ine±cient banks have the e®ective repayment
probability ¸1 and the e®ective cost of funds ½1, whereas the e±cient entrant's
repayment probability is ¸2 and the cost of funds are ½2 (this notation, following
Lemma 1, captures all possible scenarios allowing also for failure of some of the
banks). If the entrant locates at distance y from bank 0, Lemma 1 implies that
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November 2004it wins all borrowers located distance x · ¹ x0 into the direction of bank 0 and all
borrowers located distance x · ¹ x1 into the direction of bank 1, where
¹ x0 = ¸2½1 ¡ ¸1½2 + t¸2y
t(¸1 + ¸2) ;
¹ x1 = ¸2½1 ¡ ¸1½2 + t¸2(` ¡ y)
t(¸1 + ¸2) :





1). Maximizing this expression with respect to y, one obtains easily y = `=2. That
is, the entrant bank locates in the middle between the two incumbents. 2
Proof of Proposition 7: We have to show that ¹ xS > ¹ xA, i.e.
(¹ ¸








E + ¹ ¸
I + ¹ ½
t
¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I
¹ ¸
E + ¹ ¸
I :
Rewriting this inequality gives
A(¹ ¸
E + ¹ ¸
I) ¡ 2¹ ½ > t
2n :
Because ¹ ¸
E > ¹ ¸
I, this holds if
A¹ ¸
I ¡ ¹ ½ > t
4n :
But this condition merely states that ine±cient banks alone create positive surplus
which follows from (A2) and the contestable market condition (4). 2
Proof of Proposition 8: It is to show that (18) is strictly stronger than (16)
when ¹ xA < 1=(2n) and that (18) implies (17) when ¹ xA ¸ 1=(2n). Suppose ¯rst
¹ xA < 1=(2n). (18) is su±cient, but not necessary for (16), if
2A(¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I) + 2t( 1











From (3) (which follows from assumption (A2)), A ¸ (t=n + ¹ ½)=¹ ¸
I, so that (19)
holds if
2(¹ ½ + t
n)(» ¡ 1) + 2t( 1
2n ¡ ¹ x
A) > t(1 + »)¹ x
A
is satis¯ed, where » ´ ¹ ¸
E=¹ ¸
I > 1. Plugging in the de¯nition of ¹ xA yields
2(¹ ½ + t
n)(» ¡ 1) + t
n > 3 + »
1 + »
³ t
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(¹ ½ + 3t
2n)»
2 ¡ (2¹ ½ + t
2n)» + ¹ ½ ¡ t
n > 0 : (20)
The left{hand side is a quadratic in » which has a zero at » = 1 and whose minimum
is at » = (¹ ½ + t=(4n))=(¹ ½ + 3t=(2n)) < 1. Therefore, (20) holds for all » > 1 (and so
(19) holds for all ¹ ¸
E > ¹ ¸
I).
Suppose now that ¹ xA > 1=(2n) (so that also (18) holds). We must show that also
(17) is satis¯ed. ¹ xA > 1=(2n) is equivalent to
(¹ ¸
E ¡ ¹ ¸
I) > t¹ ¸I
2n½ :
This inequality is su±cient for (17) if
t¹ ¸
I
2¹ ½n > nf
A :
Using n2 < t=(2f) (from (4)), this condition follows from ¹ ¸
IA ¡ ¹ ½ > 0 (see (A2)).2
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